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Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course. By
Raoul Berger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Raoul Berger's latest book, Death Penalties: The Supreme
Court's Obstacle Course, is a new verse of the same old song. Like
Government by Judiciary, the book attacks the Supreme Court for
violating the original understanding of a provision of the Constitution (this time the eighth amendment). Like the earlier book, it
also contains "the clearly articulated theme that the principal, indeed the only, criterion for constitutional interpretation is the 'intent' of the framers." 1 Both books ultimately fail to persuade the
reader of the accuracy of their historical conclusions or the validity of their theory of constitutional interpretation.
Berger disclaims any intention to argue further his "interpretivist" or "originalist"2 theories, instead resting on copious references to his earlier work.3 He purports to confine Death Penalties
to a demonstration of the ''wide gap between what the Justices say
the 'cruel and unusual punishments' clause 'requires' and the limited purpose the Framers meant it to serve."4 In fact, several
chapters are devoted to the underlying interpretivist premise, including one chapter generally attacking judicial review,s and one
attempting to limit the language of the Constitution to its 1789
common law meaning.6 Another chapter condemns the incorporation doctrine, 1 which seems rather superfluous in light of BerI. Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or
Stateman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1752 (1978).
2. For origins and comparisons of the two terms, see generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
3. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT's OBSTACLE COURSE 9
n.29 ( 1982).
4. ld at 9.
5. Ch. 5: The Role of the Coun. This chapter is a rather shallow survey of carefully
selected quotations from various eighteenth century politicians and jurists, designed to discredit judicial review by showing the framers' "profound distrust" of judicial discretion.
Berger either fails to note, or quotes and ignores, any references to the judiciary as the least
dangerous branch or contemporaneous statements supporting judicial review. See id at 7879, quoting from Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 on the weakness of the judiciary, without
any follow-up and without referring to the statements in the same document which suppon
the concept of judicial review. See also Bedau, Berger's Defense ofthe Death Penalty: How
Not to Read the Constitution, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1152, 1155-56 & n.22 (1983).
6. Ch. 4: Co=on Law Terms in the Constitution.
7. Ch. 2: Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: En Bloc or Selective. Berger's criticism of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause is tarnished by his
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ger's main thesis that the eighth amendment itself does not bar
capital punishment. The point of these chapters-and perhaps of
the entire book-may be found in Berger's description of "the
proper role of the Court":
It is not wrapped in mystery. Fearful of the greedy expansiveness of power, the
Founders sought to confine their delegates to the power conferred. To insure that
their delegates would not 'overleap' those bounds, the courts were designed to
police those boundaries . . . . [T]here is not the slightest intimation that the
courts might supersede the legislature's exercise of power w1~hin its boundaries. a

Finally, Berger suggests two remedies for the Court's usurpation of legislative authority. The first is simply to foster a popular
awareness that "the people . . . are wrongfully being deprived of
the right to decide for themselves whether or not to enact death
penalties. . . ."9 His second suggested remedy borders on theirresponsible. He devotes an entire chapter to invoking and justifying a Congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction over capital cases
from the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.•o Such a
withdrawal of jurisdiction would at least nominally make the
most recent Supreme Court pronouncement•• "the unchangeable
law of the land ... beyond the reach of the United States
Supreme Court or state supreme courts to alter or overrule."12 It
is also a course "so fraught with constitutional doubt that although talked about from time to time, it has not been invoked for
over one hundred years."•3
failure to deal adequately with the alternative argument that the privileges and immunities
clause might easily be read to accomplish the same result. Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 28-30 & n.64 (1980); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Cniique of Raoul Berger's
History, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651,673-75 (1979). Berger attempts to refute this argument by
resorting to his much-criticized contention that the entire fourteenth amendment, including
the privileges and immunities clause, was intended solely to protect the rights enumerated
in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. BERGER, supra note 3, at 98-99. For criticism of Berger's
historical evidence for this conclusion, see Soifer, supra.
8. BERGER, supra note 3, at 86-87.
9. Id at 9.
10. Ch. 7: Congressional Contraction of Judicial Jurisdiction.
II. At this writing, one of the most recent cases happens to be one in which the Court
reversed imposition of the death penalty for failure to consider mitigating factors, Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), but as Berger notes, the Court has been neither consistent nor predictable in this area.
12. Resolution of Conference of Chief Justices, January 1982, cited in Apr. 1982
A.B.A.J. J86.
13. ELY, supra note 2, at 46 (footnotes omitted). See also Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Ex parte McCardle, !5 ARIZ. L. REv. 229, 264-66 (1973) (suggesting that Congress
cannot withdraw jurisdiction solely because of its dissatisfaction with the likely substantive
outcome).
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BERGER'S HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Berger's historical survey is detailed and comprehensive, although largely devoted to refuting Anthony Granucci's seminal
article on the historical roots of the eighth amendment.J4 Berger
begins with the Magna Carta, runs through the 1689 Bill of
Rights, details crimes and punishments in England and the
United States both before and after the adoption of the eighth
amendment, and concludes that the term "cruel and unusual" is
limited to punishments that are both "barbarous" and "no longer
customary."Js He stops just shortJ6 of committing himself to the
position that to be prohibited by the clause a punishment must
have been "no longer customary" by 1689. The strongest part of
his argument focuses on the framers' specific intent to exclude
capital punishment from the category of prohibited punishments.J7 Berger here marshalls impressive historical evidence on
the intent to exclude, including the reference to deprivation of life
in the fifth amendment. His argument overlooks, however, the
significant distinction between using history to show that the
framers intended to prohibit a certain practice and using the same
history to create the negative inference that they did not intend to
prohibit it.Js His narrow definition of cruel and unusual as "no
longer customary" also drains the clause of significance. It hardly
seems necessary to safeguard the right to be free from punishments that are no longer authorized or imposed.J9
Moreover, Berger's historical analysis is seriously flawed. He
is highly selective and inconsistent in his use of sources. For ex14. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Injlicted':· The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
15. BERGER, supra note 3, at 444.
16. /d at 41-42.
17. /d at 44-50.
18. See, e.g.• Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 397-98 (1974). Berger avoids the most direct violation of this principle: he attempts to
establish not only that the framers did not intend to outlaw capital punishment but also
that they specifically intended no/ to outlaw it. Berger's negative inference, however, is still
subject to the basic criticism that the framers' intent cannot be determined with any certainty beyond the specific evils they were attempting to curb.
19. Berger nowhere defines "customary," but since he rejects the Court's analogy to
being struck by lightning, and relies heavily on "popular support" for death penalty statutes, see, e.g. BERGER, supra note 3, at 66, 116 n.l9, presumably the death penalty will be
constitutional until it no longer commands sufficient support to allow its enactment or imposition. In this context, it would be interesting to know Berger's opinion of Enmund v.
Florida, -U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) in which the Supreme Court vacated a death
sentence imposed in a felony-murder case where the defendant "neither took life, attempted ~o ~e life, n~r intended to take life." /d at 3371. Justice White relied primarily
on a statistical analysts demonstrating the rarity with which capital punishment is either
authorized or imposed under such circumstances.
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ample, when it suits his purpose, he emphasizes the significance of
early judicial constructions as "more weighty" because closer in
time to the Framers.2o Later, in arguing that racially discriminatory imposition of the penalty is irrelevant, he relies heavily on the
premise that the fourteenth amendment allows blacks to be excluded from juries.21 He ignores an almost contemporaneousand thus under Berger's view highly significant-Supreme Court
decision invalidating a racially discriminatory jury selection
system.22
Berger's interpretations of the historical record are also often
questionable. For instance, he discusses two early versions of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment: Bingham's, which gave Congress the power to "make all laws necessary and proper to secure
. . . equal protection," and Stevens's, which simply provided that
"[a]lllaws ... shall operate impartially and equally" without regard to race.23 The distinction, as Berger rightly points out, is that
Stevens's proposal, unlike Bingham's, would work by its own
force.24 Berger's distorted perception of history then leads him to
conclude, despite the unequivocally self-executing language of the
final version,2s that "Bingham's proposal carried the day."26 He
cavalierly ignores both the obvious similarities between Stevens'
proposal and the final version, and the historical evidence that
section 1 was meant to be self-executing and section 5 was meant
to confer additional power on Congress.27
Finally, of course, Berger's vision of the "framer's intent" is
open to myriad queries and criticisms as to the identities of "the
framers" (those at Philadelphia? the state legislatures and ratifying conventions?) and whether we can discover the single intent of
so many long-dead individuals.2s Berger argues that constitutional interpretation must be confined to the intent of the framers
in order to reflect the consent of the people.29 But those who
"consented" to Berger's narrow eighteenth century interpretation
20. BERGER, supra note 3, at 11.
21. Id 56-57.
22. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 103 (1880).
23. BERGER, supra note 3, at 168.
24. Id 168-69.
25. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. Amend. XIV.
26. BERGER, supra note 3, at 169.
27. See, e.g., H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 136-139
(1908).
28. See generally Brest, supra note 2, at 214-215; Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art uf the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1755-56 ( 1978).
29. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 3, at 66:
Substitution by the Court of its own meaning for that of the Framers changes the
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of the Constitution "have been dead for a century or two."3o
Moreover, in the context of the death penalty, those who suffer
most from its imposition3t were entirely excluded, as a race, not
only from participation in the ratification process but from the
rights of citizenship at all.32
Berger also rejects any argument based on the potential interaction between the eighth amendment and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.33 He contends that the intent
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment "militate[s] against
tampering with" the sentencing process.34 The counter-arguments, which emphasize the Court's role in protecting racial minorities,3s are particularly strong in this context. First, blacks and
other minorities are disproportionately affected by the criminal
justice system in general and the death penalty in particular, as
Berger himself admits.36 Second, the Court's advances in protecting the rights of criminal defendants have often hinged, at least
implicitly, on the fact that "the notorious facts of each case exemplified the national scandal of racist southern justice."37 Finally,
even Berger's narrow reading of the fourteenth amendment concedes that it was intended as a limited departure from the ordinary idea of state sovereignty, "for the purpose of thwarting
efforts of the recalcitrant South" to re-enslave blacks.3s Taking all
of these factors together suggests that precluding the Court from
supervising the circumstances under which the death penalty is
scope of the people's consent, displaces the Framers' value choice, and violates
the basic principle of government by consent of the governed.
30. ELY, mpra note 2, at II.
31. See generally Zeisel. Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The
Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981).
32. That this is true of most, if not all. "discrete and insular minorities", United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), is further support for the argument
that the Court has a special role in interpreting the Constitution to protect such minorities.
See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980): ELY, mpra note 2. Berger rejects this theory implicitly in DEATH PENALTIES and
explicitly elsewhere. See Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87
(1981).
33. BERGER, mpra note 3, at 53-58.
34. fd at 55. He also repeats his arguments, first outlined in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, about "anti-Negro sentiments" in the North, id at 57-58. This theory has been
attacked elsewhere. See, e.g., Soifer, mpra note 7.
35. See note 32 mpra and accompanying text.
36. BERGER, mpra note 3, at 4; see also Zeisel. mpra note 31; Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S: 238, 247-48 & n.IO (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). The sentencing procedure is especially vulnerable to class-based discrimination: "[t]here is tremendous potential for the
arbitrary or invidious infiiction of 'unusually' severe punishments on persons of various
classes other than 'our own.'" ELY, mpra note 2, at 97.
37. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1306 (1982).
38. Berger, mpra note 3, at 91-92. See also Ely, mpra note 2, at 33.
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imposed would defeat one of the historic purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Berger's historical analysis of the Supreme Court cases on
capital punishment39 is largely a reiteration of his earlier arguments on the true meaning of the clause and the limited role of the
courts.40 He does persuasively demonstrate the cases' utter inconsistency with one another. The Court itself has recently explained
this inconsistency as a continuous attempt, sensitive to the need
for modification in light of perceived inadequacies of each preceding approach, to "provide standards for a constitutional death
penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused."4I The only novel argument in
this chapter is Berger's contention that judicial supervision of the
sentencing process undermines the traditional jury function of dispensing mercy.42 In fact, since the Court's interference with jury
verdicts has ultimately had the effect of requiring greater leniency
and a greater consideration of individual mitigating factors,4J the
jury's ability to be merciful is left untouched. It is only only the
jury's ability to be arbitrarily vengeful that is curtailed.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINAL INTENT

The underlying premise of the book is that by interpreting
the eighth amendment as it has, the Court has violated "the right
of the people to govern themselves":
The Court's revision of ihe "cruel and unusual punishments" clause is but one
more arrogation of power under ihe aegis of ihe Fourteenih Amendment, but
anoiher chapter in the tale of judicial make-believe.44

This underlying premise raises two important questions, one regarding the proper scope of constitutional interpretation and one
touching broader issues in the philosophy of language. I do not
propose to enter the interpretivistjnon-interpretivist debate at this
point, as the arguments have been well-rehearsed elsewhere,4s and
the dichotomy may not be as clear as the proponents of both posi39. Ch. 6: The Cases. His discussion centers on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910); McGauiha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
40. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 112-13.
41. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982).
42. BERGER, supra note 3, at 144-46.
43. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
44. BERGER, supra note 3, at 8.
45. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703
(1975); Linde, Judges, Critics anti the Realist Tradilion, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972);
Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978);
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tions once thought. 46
Even assuming, however, that the intent of the framers is relevant-{)r dispositive-there remains the question of how to
translate the subjective intent of numerous individuals, as transcribed into a set of phrases, into a broad rule governing the interpretation of those phrases. Berger's rather simplistic approach is
to ask, in essence, what the phrase meant as a term of art at common law.47 As Paul Brest has pointed out, however,
[t]he mere fact that a phrase appears in a formal legal utterance . . . does not
entail that it was used as a term of art. This is especially true of constitutional
provisions. Although the ratifying conventions that adopted the Constitution and
the legislatures that adopted the amendments included many lawyers, the vast
majority of participants were laypersons, and it cannot simply be assumed that
they used the phrase in its technical sense.48

Moreover, depending on the level of generality from which the
framers' "intention" is derived, even terms of art can be understood to convey broader protection than that accorded by Berger.
The common law referent of a term of art might be simply an
illustrative example of a broader principle: a non-customary punishment is cruel and unusual, but it may not be the only type of
punishment that is.49 Another way to state this is to note that a
principle is not limited to those applications envisioned by its
author. so
Berger's probable response to this line of argument would be
to rely on the framers' specific intent to exclude capital punishment from the prohibition of the clause. At this point, the analysis
must take a more philosophical tum. The question becomes to
what extent an author's subjective intent can limit the interpretations of the hearer or reader. It is by now almost a first principle
of contemporary philosophy of language that a speaker cannot, by
subjective intent alone, determine the meaning to be accorded his
words.s1 Thus, if the words "cruel and unusual" are capable of
Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited· Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71
N.W.U.L. REv. 417 (1976).
46. See ELY, supra note 2.
47. BERGER, supra note 3, at 61-65.
48. Brest, supra note 2, at 206 n.ll.
49. For an elaboration of the difference between an example, or "conception", and a
principle, or "concept", seeR. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1979). See
also Bedau, supra note 5, at 1161 & n.43.
50. See Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797, 806
(1982); see also L. WnTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33e:
Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I teach them gaming with dice,
and the other says, "I didn't mean that sort of game." Must the exclusion of the
game have come before his mind when he gave me the order?
51. See, e.g., W.V.O. QUINE, WoRD & OBJECT (1960); S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN
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bearing the interpretation the Court has placed on them, the
Framers' subjective intention to limit the words is irrelevant. As
one scholar has noted, "[t]he text interposes itself between the intentions of the framers and the problems of the present, cutting off
the range of permissible access and references to original intent
.... "52 As Justice Brennan has suggested, approval of the cruel
and unusual punishments clause over the objection that "the
Clause might someday prevent the legislature from inflicting . . .
death" creates an inference that the majority was "prepared to run
that risk. "53
That the words of the clause can plausibly, as a matter of
everyday meaning, be interpreted as a bar against capital punishment is the tacit assumption behind Berger's resort to the legislative history. Furthermore, the clause may not be intended to
delineate specific prohibited punishments, but instead may be an
invitation to future generations to interpret the clause.54 This is a
particularly satisfying interpretation from a philosophical standpoint, as it recognizes that an author is not always fully aware of
his own "intentions."55 This theory of constitutional interpretation was articulated by a member of the Supreme Court interpreting the fourteenth amendment shortly after its ratification:
It is possible that those who framed [the amendment) were not themselves
aware of the far reaching character of its terms. They may have had in mind but
one particular phase of social and political wrong which they desired to redress.
Yet, if the amendment, as framed and expressed, does in fact bear a broader
meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought
of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils which were
never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to be presumed that the
American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing,
and meant to decree what has in fact been decreed.56
WHAT WE SAY 38-39 (1%9): "an individual's intentions or wishes can no more produce the
general meaning for a word than they can produce horses for beggars"; Schauer, supra note
50, at 811: "the conventions of language use are superior, in the hierarchy of interpretive
tools, to the intention of the speaker.
52. Schauer, supra note 50, at 809.
53. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also
Schauer, supra note 50, at 825. Berger responds at Brennan's argument by returning to the
inclusion of references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment, BERGER, supra note
3, at 46-47, but he does not explain why of the two inconsistent clauses the Fifth Amendment takes precedence.
54. See, e.g., ELv, supra note 2, at 13-14; Brest, supra note 2 at 216-17 ( 1980); see also
Dworkin, Law As /nJerpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527, 539-40 (1982) (an author's intentions
can include "the intention to create something independent of his intentions").
55. See CAVELL, supra note 51 at 40; DwoRKIN, supra note 54, at 538.
56. Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (No. 8,408) (C.C.D. La. 1870) (Bradley, J.). It is
ironic that Berger cites Justice Bradley's opinion in this case in suppon of his contention
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed solely to protect rights encompassed by the
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The most recent debate about theories of judicial review may
have been sparked by Roe v. Wade, 57 as the last was by Brown v.
Board ofEducation 58 (and the first this century by the invalidation
of much New Deal legislation in the name of substantive due process. )59 Berger does seem motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
entice the Court away from its latest flirtation with Lochnerian60
doctrines. He explicitly accuses Justice Brennan of pure Lochnerizing6I and repeatedly states that judges should not pass on the
wisdom of laws.62 He may, however, be weakening his own case
and doing the Court a disservice. As John Hart Ely has pointed
out, the Eighth Amendment contains its own limits, in contrast to
the open-endedness of substantive due process: "The subject is
punishments, not the entire range of government action, and even
in that limited area the delegation to the interpreter is not entirely
unguided . . . ."63 The constant invocation of Lochner to criticize
cases in which the Court has at least attempted to tie its decision
to specific constitutional language is likely to have the unintended
effect of making the Court-and its critics-immune to such a
charge when it really counts.64 If Berger seriously desires to advocate principled decision-making, he must learn to distinguish unprincipled decisions from decisions with which he disagrees.
Suzanna Sherry*

1866 Civil Rights Act. BERGER, .111pra note 3, at 94-95 & n.81. Justice Bradley does reach
this conclusion, as an afterthought, 15 F. Cas. at 655, but interprets both the Act and the
Amendment to encompass much broader rights than those suggested by Berger. In fact,
Justice Bradley gives the privileges and immunities clause the broadest possible construction, and only then concludes that "the first section of the [civil rights) bill covers the same
ground as the fourteenth amendment. . . ." /d
57. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. See Meeks, Foreword, Symposium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. I, 2 (1981).
60. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61. BERGER, supra note 3, at 120 n.32.
62. See, e.g., id at 80-81.
63. Ely, supra note 2, at 14.
64. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo(f A Commenr on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 943-44 (1973). See also DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 527:
[L)egal practice is an exercise in interpretation. . . . Law so conceived is deeply
and thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad
sense of political theory. But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics,
and a critique of law that does not understand this difference will provide poor
understanding and even poorer guidance.
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

